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In 2014-15 the South African Government began to consider seriously proposals 
from the trade union federation COSATU that a uniform, ‘national’ minimum 
wage be set at a level several times higher than the lowest sectoral minimum 
wages set hitherto. The suggestion that a national minimum be set is hardly 
controversial, given that the state already regulates the wages of most low-paid 
workers and has the statutory power to regulate any that fall outside of the 
current sectoral mechanisms. What is controversial is the level at which a 
national minimum should be set, and the procedures for setting it. COSATU 
argues that a high national minimum is in line with international norms and 
would not have negative effects on employment. We show that South Africa’s 
existing sectoral minima are in fact broadly in line with international norms and 
that COSATU’s proposal is far out of line with them. We show also that both 
international and South African evidence suggests that COSATU’s proposed 
high national minimum would cause job destruction directly without any 
compensatory macro-economic boost to employment. We conclude that a high 
national minimum wage would be likely to worsen poverty and inequality, and 
suggest that expanded tax-financed social assistance and job creation 
programmes combined with South Africa’s existing sectoral minimum wages 





Over the past twenty or so years minimum wage-setting has once again become 
a popular tool of economic policy in the advanced capitalist democracies of the 
global North. This shift was driven in part by concern that median earnings have 
remained stagnant at the same time as the rich have grown richer, whilst 
opposition to minima was mitigated by academic studies suggesting that 
minimum wages in the USA and elsewhere had, contrary to the predictions of 
orthodox microeconomics, modest or no effects on employment. Citing such 
studies, even the staunchly liberal Economist joined the ranks of advocates of 
setting national minima. The post-2008 financial and economic crisis further 
fuelled scepticism about orthodox economics as well as disgust with the 
inequality driven by the grossly inflated incomes of national and global elites. 
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Allowing income inequality to continue to grow came to be seen widely as 
neither economically efficient nor normatively defensible and hence efforts were 
made in a number of countries to lift the incomes of relatively low-paid workers 
through minimum wage increases. Even the Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom, which had initially opposed the national minimum wage introduced 
by a Labour Party government in 1998, abandoned its opposition. In the 2015 
election, the Labour Party promised to raise the minimum. When the 
Conservatives won, they announced much larger increases than the one 
proposed by Labour (perhaps because they wanted to distract attention from the 
rich)! In Germany, a national minimum wage was introduced by the 
conservative Christian Democrats in 2014 (for implementation in 2015), albeit 
as part of a power-sharing deal with the Social Democratic Party. The 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) has rediscovered its enthusiasm for 
national minima, including in middle- and low-income countries as part of its 
package of regulations intended to strengthen ‘decent work’, improve 
productivity, reduce poverty, and boost economic growth (ILO, 2013, 2014).  
 
In 2014, a national minimum wage was placed on the policy agenda in South 
Africa also. Two years earlier, in 2012, the Central Executive Committee of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) had discussed a widely-
distributed ‘concept paper’ on the introduction of a national minimum wage 
written by its ‘strategist’ Neil Coleman (Coleman, 2012a).1  Coleman 
recommended that the minimum be set at between R4,800 and R6,000 per 
month, although lower minima might be set in a transitional stage. COSATU’s 
‘organisational report’ to the 2012 national congress reportedly proposed an 
initial national minimum of R2,800 per month.2 Early the following year 
COSATU adopted what seemed to be a more radical position, accepting at its 
National Bargaining Conference (in March 2013) the proposal that the national 
minimum be set at R4,500 per month.3 Coleman continued to promote his 
proposals extensively, through a published version of his paper (Coleman, 
2013a), numerous presentations (e.g. Coleman, 2012b, 2013b, 2014c, 2014d) 
and numerous articles in the media (e.g. Coleman, 2014a, 2014b, 2014e).  
 
                                                
1 Coleman’s paper was presented to the CEC in May 2012 (Coleman, 2012a). A revised 
version was presented at a conference in Cape Town in September 2012 (Coleman, 2012b) 
and published as a Working Paper by the ILO in November 2013 (Coleman, 2013a). Page 
references are to the version presented in Cape Town. 
2 See Gillian Jones, ‘National minimum wage a moot point at COSATU conference’, Mail 
and Guardian online (16th September 2012), available on http://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-16-
national-minimum-wage-debate-mooted-for-cosatu-conference, accessed 16th May 2015. 
3 See Coleman (2013a): 1, fn 1; ‘COSATU calls for increase to minimum wage’, Mail and 
Guardian online, 12th March 2013, available on http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-12-cosatu-
calls-for-increase-to-minimum-wage, accessed 16th May 2015. 
   
 
 3 
Apparently under pressure to accommodate its trade union allies in the run-up to 
the elections in May 2014, the governing African National Congress (ANC) 
included in its election manifesto a rather vague commitment to ‘investigate the 
modality for the introduction of a national minimum wage as one of the key 
mechanisms to reduce income inequality’ (ANC, 2014: 7, 26). The Minister of 
Labour, Mildred Oliphant, had already (in January 2014) told NEDLAC that her 
department was ‘of the view that minimum wages should increase to a level that 
addresses the challenge of poverty and that supports economic expansion’. She 
explained further that it would not be difficult to amend the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act to accommodate a national minimum.4 After the election, the 
issue was one of several given to the new deputy-president, Cyril Ramaphosa, to 
carry forward. In September 2014, he initiated a discussion at the National 
Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) Annual Summit. In 
early November, he (together with NEDLAC) convened a ‘Labour Relations 
Indaba’ to discuss (inter alia) the national minimum wage issue. The media 
reported that a NEDLAC ‘task team’, chaired by Ramaphosa, was expected to 
report on the technical aspects of implementing a national minimum, by July 
2015. Meanwhile, in August/September 2014, the Portfolio Committee on 
Labour in the National Assembly had held public hearings on the issue in Cape 
Town. In late 2014 and early 2015 it held hearings in different provinces.5 The 
Presidency and the Department of Labour commissioned research,6 South 
Africans have been on study tours abroad, and international organisations 
(including the International Labour Organisation, ILO) have held local 
workshops. In September 2015, Ramaphosa seemed to tell Parliament that 
business, labour and the state had agreed on the principle of a national minimum 
and negotiations were continuing over the details.7 
 
This flurry of activity around a national minimum wage was a dramatic 
innovation in terms of South African public policy. Hitherto, none of the 
government’s development visions and plans – including, most recently, the 
2010 New Growth Path and 2012 National Development Plan (NDP) – had even 
                                                
4 Oliphant speech to NEDLAC Organised Labour conference, Roodevallei, 21 Jan 2014. 
http://www.gov.za/address-honourable-minister-labour-ms-mildred-n-oliphant-mp-annual-
nedlac-organised-labour. 
5 Individuals and organisations that made presentations to the Portfolio Committee included 
employers’ organisations (including the Black Management Forum, Chamber of Mines, 
NEASA, BUSA and Agri-SA), university researchers (the Development Policy Research Unit 
(DPRU) at the University of Cape Town; Professor Neil Rankin from Stellenbosch; and the 
Social Law Project and PLAAS at the University of the Western Cape) and a few other 
organisations (the Free Market Foundation, the Progressive  Professionals’ Forum). 
6 Including from the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town. 
7 Carol Paton, ‘Minimum wage negotiations proceeding well, says Ramaphosa’, Business Day 
Live, 3rd September 2015, http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/labour/2015/09/03/minimum-
wage-negotiations-proceeding-well-says-ramaphosa.  
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mentioned a national minimum. The New Growth Path did not mention 
minimum wages at all, and emphasised wage moderation and job creation as 
well as ‘decent work’ (South Africa, 2010). The NDP recommended better 
compliance with existing sectoral minima (South Africa, 2012: 134), whilst 
emphasising overall wage moderation, lightening the regulatory burden on small 
businesses and reducing labour costs through a youth wage subsidy, with the 
objective of facilitating job creation. Nor were minimum wages mentioned in 
either the ‘Recommendations’ from the ANC’s 4th National Policy Conference 
in June 2012 or the Resolutions of its 53rd National Conference in Mangaung in 
December 2012 (ANC, 2012a, 2012b).8 
 
COSATU and other advocates presented a high national minimum wage as part 
of a strategy to reduce poverty directly amongst low-wage workers and to curb 
South Africa’s excessive inequalities, and to boost the economy through 
increased spending. It cited the recent global literature on minimum wages, and 
the experiences of Brazil and Germany specifically, in support of its argument. 
Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, COSATU (and Coleman) saw South 
Africa’s existing system of sectoral wage regulation as a failure, or at least as 
deficient. The vision of a society in which the poor are employed in well-paid 
jobs and inequalities are reduced is of course very appealing. But the 
COSATU/Coleman position overlooks the extent of unemployment in South 
Africa and the serious possibility that a high national minimum wage would 
result in job destruction, still higher unemployment, and hence worsened 
poverty and inequality. In a context of high unemployment, such as in post-
apartheid South Africa, wage-regulation needs to take into account the goal of 
job creation if the objective really is to reduce poverty and inequality.   
 
In this paper we first summarise the case put forward by Coleman and 
COSATU, noting the importance therein of the lessons supposedly to be learnt 
from the Brazilian and German cases especially. We then turn to the level of the 
national minimum, arguing that the key lesson from the German case is that the 
question of whether to have a national minimum wage is less important than the 
level at which the minimum is set. Even amidst low unemployment, the German 
national minimum wage is set paying close attention to the implications for 
employment. The Brazilian case also shows the importance of setting the level 
of the national minimum at an appropriate level. In Brazil, the national 
minimum is – in terms of purchasing power – at about the level of most existing 
sectoral minima in South Africa and well below the levels for a national 
minimum that have been proposed by Coleman and COSATU. We then turn to 
evidence on the direct effect of minimum wages on employment and 
                                                
8 Except for an obscure mention that immigrant workers should be educated about their rights, 
including to minimum wages (ANC, 2012a: para. 47(c); ANC, 2012b: para.48). 
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unemployment. We review critically the South African evidence, noting also 
recent international studies of both the methodology of researching employment 
effects and the effects of raised minima elsewhere in the global South. We 
review South Africa’s own past experience with wage regulation, showing that 
progressive technocrats and trade unionists have repeatedly opted to set minima 
in relatively labour-intensive sectors at levels far below Coleman and 
COSATU’s current proposals, in order to protect jobs. Finally, we turn to 
macro-economic arguments in favour of a high national minimum wage. We 
acknowledge that the Brazilian case showed that, in specific circumstances, 
raised minimum wages can contribute to poverty-reduction and economic 
growth. But the Brazilian case shows also the limits to this argument: In Brazil 
itself, macroeconomic conditions are no longer amenable to increases in 
minimum wages. We argue that economic conditions in South Africa are also 
not conducive to the kind of wage-led growth advocated by COSATU and 
Coleman in support of a high national minimum wage. 
 
Neither the experiences of Brazil and Germany (or of other countries), nor 
evidence from South Africa itself, suggest that COSATU and Coleman are 
correct in their assertions that a national minimum wage set at levels 
significantly above existing sectoral levels would reduce unemployment and 
poverty in South Africa. There is a very real danger that a high national 
minimum wage would reduce wage inequality at the cost of higher 
unemployment and hence poverty. This is not an argument for the deregulation 
of wages, but rather an argument broadly in favour of South Africa’s existing 
system of minimum wage-setting that takes into account sectoral and regional 
conditions (although we do advocate modest reforms of some aspects of the 
current system). A national minimum should provide a very basic floor, above 
which higher sectoral minima would be set where these would not result in job 
destruction. Inequality could be reduced by increasing the taxation of high 
earners and using the additional revenue to create jobs either through wage 
subsidies or public works programmes.  
 
 
COSATU’s shifting view of wage-setting 
 
South Africa’s existing system of minimum wage-setting was established in the 
late 1990s by the democratically-elected ANC-led government, after 
negotiations with organised business and organised labour, and at the same time 
as the issue was considered in detail by a Presidential Labour Market 
Commission. The institutional foundations of the system dated back to the 
1920s, but had long been used to protect the interests of white workers, 
including usually through the systematic exclusion or marginalisation of African 
workers (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). The reforms of the 1990s deracialised the 
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system, providing for the regulation of the wages of all – or at least potentially 
all – low- and even medium-waged workers, regardless of race, sector or 
location within South Africa. The two legislative pillars of wage regulation were 
the 1995 Labour Relations Act (LRA) and the 1997 Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA). 
 
The LRA provided for minimum wages to be set through sectoral collective 
agreements, between trade unions and employers’ associations in registered 
bargaining councils, which were then almost always ‘extended’ by the Minister 
of Labour to all employers and workers in the sector or industry concerned. As 
of late 2014, there were 30 bargaining councils in South Africa setting wages for 
an estimated 2.2 million workers, according to the Department of Labour (South 
Africa, 2014) – although this figure probably under-estimated workers affected 
by extensions. Some sectors – notably gold- and coal-mining, and automobile 
manufacturing – have comparably institutionalised collective bargaining outside 
of the bargaining council system. Collective agreements often provide detailed 
schedules of wages for different occupations, experience, and even locations 
(although trade unions, sometimes with the support of major employers, have 
long pushed for the reduction of regional differentiation). In the clothing sector, 
for example, the lowest minimum wage gazetted by the Minister of Labour in 
2014 was R565/week, for inexperienced machinists in selected non-metropolitan 
areas (although new employees could be paid 20 percent less, i.e. R452/week or 
R1,898/month, subject to conditions). 
 
The BCEA provided for minimum wage setting and the regulation of conditions 
of employment in sectors where trade unions and employers’ associations are 
weak or non-existent, and where workers are considered ‘vulnerable’. Under the 
BCEA, the Minister of Labour instructs the Employment Conditions 
Commission (ECC) to investigate a sector and recommend a Sectoral 
Determination that sets out minimum wages and conditions of employment. The 
BCEA explicitly requires the ECC to take into account the affordability of wage 
increases and the risk of job losses as well as the cost of living. The Department 
of Labour estimated that, at the end of 2014, a total of between three and five 
million workers were covered by the ten Sectoral Determinations (South Africa, 
2014). The lowest minimum wage at the end of 2014, set under a Sectoral 
Determination, was R1,813/month, for domestic workers in some parts of South 
Africa,  
 
There are two important differences between the mechanisms for wage 
regulation in the LRA and BCEA. First, whereas the LRA provided for bipartite 
(employer/union) negotiations and extensions by the Minister of Labour, the 
ECC (established under the BCEA) included independent experts appointed by 
the Minister as well as representatives of organised business and labour. 
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Secondly, the ECC is required to take into account potentially adverse 
employment effects, but there is no such requirement in the LRA. In practice, 
however, these differences have hitherto been somewhat muted. Bargaining 
councils have generally been much less sensitive than the ECC to employment 
effects, but cannot disregard them entirely, both because trade union members 
might be affected and because of negative publicity. Furthermore, many of the 
sectoral determinations recommended by the ECC are linked to agreements 
reached by employers and unions in informal bargaining fora. Occasionally the 
wage minima set in collective agreements under the LRA, covering part of 
South Africa, have been lower than the minima set through a sectoral 
determination under the BCEA in the same sector but elsewhere in the country. 
The fundamental similarity between the LRA and BCEA is that both have 
enshrined a system of sectoral wage regulation, rather than setting a uniform 
national minimum across all sectors, and have also allowed (and often practiced) 
regional differentiation in response to differential costs of living and production. 
 
This system of sectoral wage regulation was the result of careful thought and 
deliberation. In the late 1980s COSATU opted for industrial or sectoral 
bargaining, with a single COSATU-affiliated union bargaining with employers 
in each industry or sector. When COSATU debated minimum wages in the early 
1990s, it decided against demanding a uniform national minimum wage and 
opted instead for sector-specific minima. The argument in favour of continuing 
with sectoral minima was made most forcefully by the Southern African 
Clothing and Textiles Workers’ Union (SACTWU): ‘A minimum wage that is 
determined according to the cost structure of each industry would be better able 
to look after the interests of that sector and thereby the interests of the workers 
employed in that industry’ – whilst minima set without taking into account the 
cost structure of the industry would have ‘disastrous’ consequences for job 
destruction, especially in sectors such as clothing manufacturing, agriculture and 
domestic work.9 COSATU recognised that it should not call for a high national 
minimum wage (which ‘would be difficult to enforce and could lead to massive 
job loss’) and could not call for a low national minimum (because it would not 
look good, even if it did not destroy jobs) (Seekings, forthcoming a). 
 
For about fifteen years COSATU and its affiliated unions used without evident 
objection the sectoral wage-setting mechanisms provided by the LRA and 
BCEA. In sectors where most employers could afford higher wages, trade 
unions pushed successfully for generous collective agreements, backing up their 
bargaining positions with the threat or reality of strike action. In sectors where 
most employers could not afford large wage increases, trade unions tended to 
                                                
9 ‘The National Minimum Wage: A Contribution to the Debate’, by Lesley Maasdorp & Mark 
Bennett for SACTWU, sent to the COSATU Living Wage Working Group, 24 June 1990. 
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exercise wage restraint. In the clothing manufacturing sector, for example, the 
closure of factories and its declining membership prompted SACTWU into a 
chronically pragmatic position in wage negotiations, raising only modestly the 
real wages of its core membership in Cape Town (although the union was more 
willing to risk the jobs of non-members in non-metropolitan areas such as 
Newcastle, in Northern KwaZulu-Natal) (Nattrass & Seekings, 2014). Outside 
of the public sector, most wage negotiations were concluded without major 
strikes. On the ECC, trade unionists pushed for incremental improvements in 
real wage minima for vulnerable, non-unionised workers, but almost never 
dissented from the majority decisions (Seekings, forthcoming b). The result was 
a set of minima that varied not only between occupations and regions, but also 
between sectors.  
 
COSATU’s post-2012 embrace of a high, uniform, national minimum wage thus 
entailed not only the rejection of the existing, sectoral, post-apartheid wage-
setting system, but also the reversal of its own pro-sectoral approach over the 
preceding twenty or more years. For whatever reason, COSATU seems to have 
decided that the existing system of wage regulation was deficient. In Coleman’s 
analysis, the ‘apartheid wage structure’ had barely changed, with ‘the majority 
of black workers continu[ing] to live in poverty’. COSATU’s own 2012 survey 
apparently found that 20 percent of COSATU workers reported earning less than 
R2,500 per month, and 45 percent reported earning less than R5,000 per month 
(Coleman, 2012b: 2-3).10 Sectoral determinations under the BCEA were ‘partial 
(only covering some low paid sectors), uncoordinated, with big variations in the 
minima, and without any coherent rationale in terms of the basic subsistence 
needs of workers’ (ibid: 3). Many of the minima set under collective agreements 
under the LRA were not much better, Coleman wrote, listing a series of sectors 
(furniture manufacturing, retail and hospitality, contract cleaning, laundry 
services and even the motor industry) where unions had agreed to minima that 
were lower even than the minimum in the clothing industry. The lowest of these 
was in the hairdressing industry in Pretoria: R1,297 per month (in 2011) (ibid: 4-
5). Moreover, he suggested, the existing ‘patchwork’ of sectoral minima had 
large ‘gaps’ (ibid: 25) with many low-paid workers not covered at all. The 
‘entire wage-fixing system … needs to be re-evaluated’, with the adoption of 
‘effective, large-scale state intervention in the wage structure’, as in Brazil (ibid: 
7). In retrospect, Coleman wrote, COSATU erred in the early 1990s in not 
pushing for a national minimum wage as well as sectoral bargaining (ibid: 9). 
Coleman argued that South Africa should follow the Brazilian example in 
setting and raising aggressively a national minimum wage, doing away with the 
existing ‘voluntarist’ collective bargaining system and the ‘technocratic’ system 
                                                
10 This finding sits uneasily with data from independent sources, that suggest that almost no 
trade union members are in the poorest half of the population, and less than 10 percent are in 
the bottom two earnings quintiles (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015: 61-3). 
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of sectoral determinations. The national minimum wage would serve as a floor, 
above which wages could be set through sectoral collective bargaining. 
 
Coleman subsequently elaborated on how and why the ECC had failed to protect 
adequately vulnerable workers. In his assessment, the ECC has been the victim 
of elite capture, by a combination of technocrats and (unidentified) ‘powerful 
interests’: 
 
‘The Employment Conditions Commission, responsible for 
recommending sectoral minima, has not distinguished itself as a 
powerful advocate for vulnerable workers. The impression exists that 
the lobbying by employers’ interests, around arguments such as 
“affordability” are more influential in setting these minima than any 
objective criteria of workers’ needs. Inherited apartheid wage 
structures in cheap labour sectors have not been fundamentally 
disturbed. … The legislative provisions in the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act governing the ECC, need to be evaluated, to assess 
whether its composition and mandate is appropriate, …, particularly in 
the light of how this mandate has been interpreted in practice’ 
(Coleman, 2013a: 30, 53). 
 
Coleman neither acknowledged nor explained why trade union representatives 
on the ECC had gone along with most of the ECC’s recommendations for 
sectoral determinations. Turning to wage-setting under the LRA, Coleman 
suggested that trade unions in the private sector had failed to raise more 
aggressively workers’ minimum wages through collective agreements because 
they had been ‘blackmailed’ by employers, who had threatened to collapse the 
collective bargaining system in the sector. Employers could only do this, he 
wrote, because collective bargaining was voluntary (and he therefore advocated 
making centralized collective bargaining mandatory in all sectors for all 
employers). In short, Coleman viewed the existing institutions of wage-setting 
as weakening trade unions and their representatives, and proposed state-imposed 
institutional reforms to strengthen trade unions, giving them more – and more 
centralized – control over wage-setting. 
 
Coleman did not consider the possibility that trade unions and their 
representatives may have been constrained by a recognition of the risks of job 
destruction (as SACTWU and others had warned in the early 1990s). Coleman 
did not ignore entirely the (un)employment issue, but cited foreign experience 
and thinking as well as South African studies in support of his contention that 
introducing and raising a national minimum wage would not have any negative 
effects on employment. In Coleman’s account, higher minimum wages would 
instead fuel demand-led growth, resulting in more not fewer jobs. According to 
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Coleman, the increase in minimum wages in Brazil in the mid-2000s – the so-
called ‘Lula moment’ – was an example of precisely the kind of wage-led 
growth that South Africa should emulate (Coleman, 2013a). A similar economic 
logic was displayed by COSATU’s spokesman in response to the German 
government’s decision (in 2014) to introduce a national minimum wage:  
 
‘If right-wing European governments with lower levels of inequality 
than South Africa can successfully enforce a national minimum wage, 
there can be no argument that it is both necessary and practical in 
South Africa. COSATU will continue to demand that it be brought in 
as quickly as possible, and remains convinced that it will both reduce 
inequality and poverty and stimulate economic growth as the 
additional money earned by workers is converted into increased 
demand for goods and services, which in turn will lead to more jobs 
for those producing the goods and delivering the services’ (COSATU, 
2014). 
 
As Coleman and COSATU have made clear, this debate is not simply about a 
national minimum wage. It is instead about how a national minimum wage 
could be used, by trade unions who have deepened their institutional powers 
through their leverage within the ANC and ANC-led Alliance, as part of a 
broader transformation of the political economy. This is important because the 
goal of a national minimum wage could be achieved without any reform of 
existing institutions of wage-setting. Not only are the wages of most low-wage 
workers already regulated,11 and the Minister of Labour can instruct the ECC to 
recommend minima in any unregulated sectors, but the 2013 Basic Conditions 
of Employment Amendment Act (Act 20 of 2013, which became effective in 
September 2014) explicitly provides for the Minister to ‘publish a sectoral 
determination that applies to employers and employees who are not covered by 
any other sectoral determination’ or bargaining council collective agreement12 – 
i.e. to ensure that every South African worker is subject to minimum wage-
regulation. The issue at stake in the debate over a national minimum wage is not 
the principle of countrywide wage regulation, but rather the level at which a 
national minimum should be set, and hence the procedures for setting it, the 
institution that will do so, and the criteria it will be required to take into 
account. Put bluntly, the choice is between (1) procedures that (as under the 
current BCEA) involve technocrats as well as corporatist representatives and 
require them to take employment effects into account, and that devolve decision-
                                                
11 It is very unclear how many low-paid workers are not covered. In 2014-15 the ECC itself 
began to investigate new sectoral determinations to cover sectors that were not yet covered, 
including especially the building industry (only parts of which were covered by sectoral 
determinations for the civil engineering industry). 
12 Section 8(f), revising section 50 of the original Act. 
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making to the sectoral level (as under the current BCEA and in bargaining 
councils under the LRA), and (2) a centralised and presumably politically-driven 
procedure without any apparent requirement to take job destruction into account. 
 
  
The Level of the Minimum Wage 
 
Three approaches predominate in South Africa in the calculation of minimum 
wages: basing it on the cost of living; setting it in relation to median or mean 
wages; and taking into account economic factors such as the likely effects on 
employment. Trade unions and allied intellectuals have long used the cost of 
living as a basis for estimating what constitutes a ‘living wage’, informing 
unions’ demands in wage negotiations as well as thinking about the level of a 
minimum wage in statutory bodies like the ECC. In his initial concept paper, 
Coleman argued for a national minimum wage that was much higher than many 
existing sectoral minima because many of these sectoral minima did not suffice 
to raise workers out of poverty (Coleman, 2012b: 28-9). He also argued that 
‘international norms’ regarding the ratio of minimum to average wages indicated 
that South Africa ought to raise minimum wages. He calculated that the ratio of 
minimum to average wages in South Africa was about 20 percent, compared to 
40-50 percent in OECD countries (and, after big increases, Brazil) (ibid: 30) and 
concluded that a national minimum wage of between R4,800 and R6,000 per 
month, in 2011 prices (i.e. R5,650 to R7,060 in 2014 prices), would be more in 
line with these norms. Such comparisons are, however, highly sensitive to how 
the minimum wage is calculated when there are multiple minima (i.e. should it 
be the lowest minimum or a weighted average?) and how average wages are 
calculated (e.g. whether in affected sectors only or in the economy as a whole, 
how adjusted for hours worked or for survey sampling error). Data from the ILO 
database (ILOSTAT) collated mainly from government reports and labour force 
surveys suggest that the ratio of the average South African minimum wage to 
mean wages in 2012 was higher than suggested by Coleman (see Figure 1). And 
even though South Africa’s ratio was below average for the countries reported in 
the figure, this in and of itself does not necessarily amount to an argument for 
raising South African minimum wages: wage inequality can be addressed also 
by limiting bonuses (perhaps through taxation) and the like at the top end.  
 
 




Source: ILOSTAT (http://www.ilo.org/ilostat) 
 
Figure 1:  Ratio of minimum wages to mean monthly wages (total) in 
2012 (data downloaded from ILOSTAT, 8 September 2015).   
 
 
Coleman himself recognised, however, that a national minimum wage of R4,800 
to R6,000 (in 2011) might not be achievable in the short-term, ‘it should 
definitely be a target which we aim to progressively realise over the medium-
term’. A ‘useful start’, he suggested, would be to set a minimum at between 
R2,500 and R3,000 (in 2011 prices, i.e. between R2,940 and R3,530 in 2014 
prices) (Coleman, 2012b: 30). Although far below the ‘minimum living level’ 
and ‘international benchmarks’, this would raise substantially the wages of 
many less skilled workers (ibid: 37). Coleman did not articulate the implicit 
economic reasoning as to why a high minimum could not be achieved 
immediately (i.e. that it would undermine employment), but he mentioned 
sectors such as agriculture and domestic work, the implication being that sectors 
such as these could not afford much larger increases. In his Powerpoint 
presentation to COSATU’s Collective Bargaining, Organising and Campaigns 
Conference in March 2013 (Coleman, 2013b), he omitted to mention the lower 
figure. The COSATU conference reportedly endorsed a minimum of R4,500 per 
month (R4,780 in 2014 prices), which was about the same as the ‘minimum 
living level’. Subsequent presentations by Coleman (Coleman, 2014c, 2014d) 
and statements by COSATU (e.g. COSATU, 2014) did not specify any figure, 
but pointed to the minimum living level (or what Statistics South Africa now 
called the ‘upper-bound poverty line’) which by 2014 implied a household 
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that COSATU had ‘not proposed a figure yet, but has expressed the view that 
R4,500 is a useful benchmark, because it approximates the minimum living 
level and is about 40% of the average national wage’ (supposedly ‘an 
internationally used yardstick’) (Coleman, 2014e). ILO data, however, put South 
Africa’s minimum wages at 34 percent of the average wage in 2012 (Figure 1).  
 
In early 2015, COSATU’s Gauteng leaders told the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Labour that the minimum wage should be set at R7,000 per 
month and the South African Communication Union called for a minimum wage 
of R12,500 (Gernetzky, 2015). All of these proposed minima by COSATU and 
affiliates would entail substantial increases above the lowest existing sectoral 
minima, in sectors such as clothing (regulated under the LRA) or domestic work 
(regulated under the BCEA). The COSATU suggestion of R4,500/month (or 
about R5,000/month, in 2015 prices) would more than double the minima in 
these sectors. A national minimum of R7,000 per month would more than treble 
these existing sectoral minima. These kinds of increase in minimum wages 
would probably be unprecedented in global history.  
 
Coleman regards the Brazilian case as especially informative for the South 
African debate on national minimum wages.  Table 1 reports minimum wages in 
South Africa, Brazil and Germany in both local currency units (LCUs) and 
international dollars, reflecting equivalent purchasing power. The lowest 
minimum wage for domestic workers in poorer parts of South Africa, which was 
raised to R1,813/month in late 2014, corresponded to R1,541 in 2011 prices, and 
was thus between one third and one quarter of Coleman’s target national 
minimum (and about 60 percent of his proposed transitional minimum). Yet 
even this minimum was not far below the Brazilian national minimum in terms 
of purchasing power. In Brazil, the minimum wage in 2014 was 724 reis per 
month, which in terms of purchasing power in the US was worth $385/month. 
An equivalent wage in South Africa would have been R2,198/month). In 2015, 
the Brazilian minimum wage was raised to 788 reis per month, worth $419 (the 
South African equivalent purchasing power being R2,392 per month). In other 
words, the national minimum wage in Brazil is very similar, in terms of 
purchasing power, to the average of the minima set by the ECC in sectoral 
determinations in 2014 (i.e. R2,362/month) and is lower than the average 
minimum set by bargaining councils (R2,732/month). The Brazilian minimum 
wage is lower also in terms of purchasing power than the minimum wage set by 
ministerial extension in the South African clothing industry (R2,638/month), 
and is considerably lower than the minimum wage for qualified machinists in 
the clothing industry in Cape Town (R3,834/month). It is also lower than the 
minimum wage set by the ECC for workers on farms (R2,606/month from 
March 2015), in contract cleaning (R2,683/month from January 2015) and 
various other sectors. If South Africa was to set a national minimum wage at the 
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Brazilian level in 2015, in terms of purchasing power, it would be set at R2,392, 
which would make no difference to most of the sectors where wages are set by 
either bargaining councils and ministerial extensions (under the LRA) or the 
ECC and Minister (under the BCEA). In short, in terms of purchasing power, 
South Africa’s existing sectoral minima are not low in comparison with the 
Brazilian national minimum. Indeed, they are remarkably in line with it.  
 
National minimum wages are obviously linked to the level of development of a 
country, so one would expect South African minimum wages to be lower than 
minimum wages in Brazil (as South Africa’s per capita income is only 80 
percent of Brazil’s) or, more obviously, Germany.  The German national 
minimum wage of €8.5/hour (introduced in January 2015) amounts to €1,473 
per month assuming a 40-hour week. This corresponds to $1,796 or 
R10,255/month in terms of local purchasing power.  Coleman’s target minimum 
(R4,800-6,000 in 2011 prices (about R5,810-7,260 in 2015 prices) would entail 
raising the South Africa minimum to between 60 and 70 percent of the German 
minimum – a truly radical suggestion given that German per capita income is 
three and a half times that of South Africa’s.   
 
 
Table 1. South African minimum wages in comparative context 
 
 Brazil Germany South Africa 
 LCU 
(Reis) $ (PPP) 
LCU 
(Euro) $ (PPP) 
LCU 
(Rand) $ (PPP) 
GDP per capita 






































Ratio of minimum 
annual wage to 
GDP per capita 
(2014/5)** 
0.32 0.45 0.31 
PPP conversion 
factor for GDP 
(2014) 
1.69 0.79 5.39 
PPP conversion 
factor for private 
consumption 
(2014) 
1.88 0.82 5.71 
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Notes: * Using PPP (purchasing power parity) conversion factor for private 
consumption (international $) 2013. This is the number of units of a country’s 
currency required to buy the same amounts of goods and services in the 
domestic market as a U.S. dollar would buy in the United States. This 
conversion factor is for private consumption (i.e., household final consumption 
expenditure). ** Using minimum wages for 2014 (except for Germany where 
the January 2015 minimum is used).  




The minimum wage is 45 percent of GDP per capita in Germany, and 32 percent 
in Brazil. In South Africa, the minimum wage of a domestic worker is 
marginally lower, at 31 percent of GDP per capita, but the average minimum set 
through sectoral determinations (R2,362 in 2014) was 40 percent of GDP per 
capita in 2014, i.e. significantly higher than that in Brazil and approaching that 
of Germany.  If South Africa’s minimum wage was set (in 2014) at the same 
proportion of GDP per capita as Brazil, it would be R1,875, and if it was set at 
the same proportion of GDP per capita as is the case in Germany it would be 
R2,636. These are far below the figures bandied about by Coleman and 
COSATU. Minimum wages set at Coleman’s target band (R4,500 to R6,000 in 
2011 i.e. R5,648 and R7,060 in 2014) would have amounted  to 96 percent and 
121 percent of GDP per capita respectively. This would be way out of line with 
the GDP per capita ‘benchmarks’ set by Brazil and Germany. 
 
Figure 2 reports the ratio of (annualised) minimum wages (using data from 
ILOSTAT) to GDP per capita (from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators) for 2013 for middle-income countries.  It shows by these measures, 
South Africa’s ratio of minimum wage to GDP was higher than that of Brazil 
and close to the median for middle-income countries (48.1 percent).13  
 
                                                
13 It was also in line with the German figure (45 percent) reported in Table 1. 




NB: ILOSTAT data on minimum wages are national minima if these exist or 
(apparently unweighted) averages of regional and sectoral minimum wages). 




Figure 2:  Ratio of annual average minimum wage to GDP per capita 
2013, middle-income countries. 
 
 
Source: ILOSTAT (http://www.ilo.org/ilostat and World Development Indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). 
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Figure 3 shows, using the ILO’s measure of average minimum wages in South 
Africa in 2013 (R2,474), that South Africa’s minimum wages were slightly 
higher than predicted by the average relationship for middle-income countries. 
This suggests, yet again, that South Africa’s existing minimum wages are not 
out of line with international comparisons.   
 
Given the weakness of Coleman’s argument around ‘international benchmarks’, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that advocates of a high minimum have reverted to 
arguments about the ‘cost of living’. This approach was reinvigorated by recent 
research showing that a  minimum wage of R4,125/month would bring ‘an 
average poor household with at least one wage earner up to the poverty line’ 
(Finn, 2015: 47). There are several important limitations to this study. Firstly, it 
takes earnings data at face value, despite the fact that there is evidence that wage 
earnings are under-reported in household surveys – as the author himself 
acknowledges (Finn, 2015: 38; see also Seekings, 2014). Secondly, and more 
importantly, the study employed a static analysis that did not consider any 
impact on employment or other dynamic economic effects on poverty. Finn 
acknowledges this, referring the readers to a dynamic micro-simulation that 
found that higher minimum wages are likely to have only a marginal impact on 
inequality, that job losses are likely to affect the poorest among minimum wage 
workers and that because of this and rising prices, increasing minimum wages 
are ‘not an effective anti-poverty tool in South Africa’ (Pauw & Leibbrandt, 
2012: 771). Finn’s paper should thus not be seen as in any way a 
recommendation that minimum wages be set at this level. Thirdly, the 
methodology was limited to probing how much an individual breadwinner-
worker’s wage would have to rise to raise poor households out of poverty. It did 
not consider the alternative scenario of increasing household earnings up to the 
desired level through the creation of additional low-wage jobs. Households can 
and do rise above the poverty line through multiple earnings, despite the fact 
that individual workers earn low wages. Finally, Finn shows that wage 
inequality is high in South Africa because of the earnings of the very rich – yet 
the paper only considers minimum wage policies to address this wage inequality 
rather than probing various policy options to address high earnings. 
 
Finn reports that the ratio of wage earnings of richest to poorest deciles was 15 
in South Africa, as compared to 7 in Brazil (Finn, 2015: 32). Given that South 
Africa’s minimum wages are already in line with Brazil’s, by several measures, 
an obvious implication is that South Africa’s highest wage earners earn over 
double that of their Brazilian counterparts. This probably reflects skills 
shortages in South Africa and the increasing bias towards capital- and skill-
intensive growth. Even so, room probably exists to combat inequality in 
household disposable income through increasing taxation at the top end. 
Between 1998 and 2002 South Africa’s top personal income tax rate was 
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decreased from 45 percent to 40 percent and effective personal income tax has 
remained below its peak of 20.6 percent in 1999/2000 (South Africa, 2015: 46). 
According to the Davis Tax Committee, ‘there appears to be some scope to 
increase taxes on capital income, marginal personal income tax and indirect 
taxes such as fuel levies and VAT’ (ibid: 47). A small increase in personal 
income tax was effected in the 2015 budget. Further increases in progressive 
income taxation should be considered as part of a wider strategy to fund an 
expanded public works programme. This would do more to address poverty and 
inequality than a significantly increased minimum wage.    
 
 
The Direct Effects of High Minimum Wages on 
Employment 
 
COSATU’s decision not to call for a national minimum wage in the early 1990s 
was the result, in large part, of the argument made by SACTWU, other unions 
and union-allied researchers, that a high minimum would destroy jobs in low-
wage sectors, including clothing manufacturing (organized by SACTWU) as 
well as unorganised sectors such as domestic work and agriculture. When 
Coleman resuscitated proposals for a high national minimum in 2012, he 
acknowledged implicitly that unemployment and job destruction might need to 
be taken into account. His proposal that more modest minima be set during a 
phasing-in period suggested that there might at least be transitional problems, 
and he also acknowledged that sectors such as agriculture and domestic work 
posed special challenges. He went on to argue that both international and South 
African evidence suggested that anxieties over job destruction were misplaced, 
going as far as claiming that every purported link between high minima and 
unemployment is a ‘myth’ (Coleman, 2014b). But his discussion of both 
international and South African evidence was highly selective, resulting in gross 
complacency over the risk of job destruction. 
 
Coleman writes that ‘there has been a decisive shift in international thinking in 
favour of the national minimum wage’, and ‘previous dogma by conservative 
economists about the employment destroying effect of minimum wages have 
been comprehensively discredited’ (2012b: 10). The first claim overlooks 
necessary qualification, and the second claim is simply not true. Coleman relies 
primarily on reports from the ILO, which has argued strongly for wage 
regulation, but with qualifications that Coleman ignores. Coleman ignores 
entirely the more skeptical research from the World Bank and other sources. 
 
Coleman is correct to suggest that there was a widespread backlash among 
economists against the view, rooted in theory, that wage regulation necessarily 
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reduces employment. In the mid-1990s, Card & Krueger (1994) used a 
difference-in-difference comparison, contrasting the employment trend in 
employers in one sector and area covered by an increased minimum wage with 
the trend in a control group of employers in a comparable sector and area, and 
found in one case in the USA that raised minimum wages were associated with 
relative employment growth. The Achilles heel of this methodology was the 
quality of the counterfactual comparison. Neumark & Wascher (2008) 
comprehensively reviewed research from the USA and concluded that the 
evidence for positive employment effects was poor, and evidence of negative 
employment effects on unskilled employment was strong (see also Neumark et 
al., 2014). A series of recent studies have argued that negative employment 
effects have often been underestimated because studies have focused too much 
on short-term changes in employment. Sorkin (2015) suggested that the demand 
for labour might be inelastic in the short-term, but elastic in the longer-term, as 
employers substitute capital for labour. Meer & West (2015) argue that 
minimum wages affect employment over time ‘through changes in growth rather 
than an immediate drop in relative employment levels’. Using data from three 
administrative panel datasets from the USA, over the period 1975-2012, they 
found that the negative employment effect peaks three or more years after the 
relative increase in minimum wages. Aaronson et al. (2015) examined the 
mechanism through which firms substitute capital for labour. They found that 
existing employers in the fast-food restaurant industry are unable easily to 
substitute capital for labour in response to minimum wage increases, but new 
employers – who are typically restaurant chains – can do so. Even over the 
short-term, industries adjust to changed wages through the exit of more labour-
intensive employers and the entry of less labour-intensive ones. In light of this 
research, The Economist backed away from its earlier endorsement of minimum 
wages, concluding that evidence of modest short-term effects might be a ‘poor 
guide’ to the long-term effects of large increases.14 
 
Evidence from developing countries is even less consistent with Coleman’s 
claims. The ILO (2013) is emphatic in concluding that minimum wages have 
had small or no effects on employment in developed countries, but concludes 
that employment effects in developing countries depend on the economic 
context, the level of the minimum wage, enforcement, and the ‘labour market 
peculiarities and institutions prevailing in each country’ (2013: 49). A World 
Bank study goes further: 
  
‘The clear majority of developing-country studies find some adverse 
employment effects, but this is not always the case. … Not 
surprisingly, researchers tend to find that employment effects are 
                                                
14 ‘Destination Unknown’ (Free Exchange), The Economist, 25th July 2015, p60. 
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generally more significant at the segment of the wage distribution 
where the minimum wage actually “bites”. … A negative employment 
effect can extend beyond workers earning around the minimum wage, 
but it tends to dissipate as one moves up the wage distribution’ 
(Betcherman, 2014: 8). 
 
The primary losers are therefore young workers and women, the less skilled, and 
workers in small firms. This study concurs with the ILO that the effects are 
often modest either because of non-compliance or because minima are set at low 
levels, anticipating employment effects. Large increases in minima have tended 
to have substantial negative effects on employment especially when demand for 
labour was weak (for example, in Colombia in the 1990s) (ibid: 10).  
 
Minimum wage increases in the USA and developing countries alike rarely had 
dramatic effects on aggregate employment because, as Freeman has noted, 
policy-makers usually take likely employment effects into account when they set 
the level of the minimum: ‘policy-makers are aware of the potential harm of 
very high minimum wages, so they tend to set them at a reasonable level, 
roughly in line with prevailing market wages for unskilled workers’ (Freeman, 
2010, cited in Betcherman, 2014). Showing that minimum wages usually have a 
limited effect on employment tells us more about the decision-making of the 
wage-setting institutions than it does about the general relationship between 
wages and employment. As Freeman (2010) emphasises, finding that minimum 
wages generally have modest negative effects on employment ‘does not mean 
that demand curves do not slope downward or that a high minimum wage cannot 
decimate employment’ (2010: 4,667). In Brazil – discussed at length by 
Coleman (e.g. 2012b: 11-20) – steady real increases in minimum wages did 
coincide for a while with declining unemployment and even a shift from 
informal to formal employment, but minimum wages remained modest and 
employment trends were made possible by unusual and unsustainable macro-
economic expansion (as we discuss further below). 
 
The South African evidence on the relationship between minimum wages and 
employment is also ambiguous, as Coleman himself seems to acknowledge. 
Coleman correctly suggests that there is no mechanical relationship between 
minimum wages and employment, noting that employment is affected by other 
factors besides wages. But he also describes as a ‘myth’ the claim that minimum 
wages destroy jobs (2012b: 39; see also Coleman, 2014b). The South African 
evidence that minimum wages affects employment is, however, much clearer 
than he acknowledges, and does not support his bold advocacy of a massively 
increased minima. As discussed below, econometric studies (by Bhorat et al.), 
the investigations and experience of the ECC and bargaining councils over the 
past fifteen years, and sectoral studies all suggest that minimum wages have 
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modest effects on employment when they are set at low levels, taking into 
account potential job losses, but job destruction does occur when minima are 
raised dramatically, especially among less skilled workers in tradable sectors. 
 
Econometric studies by Bhorat et al. (2013, 2014) have used a version of the 
difference-in-difference methodology employed in the USA. Like the American 
studies, they rely on specifying a counterfactual, i.e. finding a control group of 
employers that approximate to the employers affected by the minimum wage in 
all respects except for the minimum wage. In the USA, this typically entails 
selecting employers in the same sector, often carefully defined, in a 
neighbouring state (because each American state sets its own minima). In Bhorat 
et al.’s studies of South Africa, they employ as control groups occupations with 
similar skill characteristics as the affected sector, but not affected by the wage 
increase. Given that very few unskilled or semi-skilled workers are not affected 
by wage regulation, any ‘control group’ is probably subject to rising minima, 
with the result that Bhorat et al. probably underestimate job destruction, because 
unskilled jobs are being destroyed across the board. Bhorat et al.’s findings on 
aggregate effects on employment probably also obscure more negative effects 
on vulnerable, less skilled workers specifically. 
 
Taken at face value, however, Bhorat et al.’s research suggests that the demand 
for labour in most non-tradable sectors is only weakly wage-elastic at the wage 
levels at which minima have been set hitherto, whilst the demand in tradable 
sectors (i.e. sectors exposed to international competition) is more obviously 
wage-elastic. This is hardly surprising. The demand for domestic work has 
remained buoyant in part because the rising real earnings of the rich have meant 
that many domestic employers have been able to pay their domestic employers 
higher wages. The demand for farmworkers, in contrast, has fallen dramatically, 
in part because of the rising minimum, in part for other reasons. Bhorat et al. 
(2014) conclude that ‘employment fell significantly’ following the 2002 sectoral 
determination in agriculture, with the minimum wage explaining most of the 
200,000 jobs lost over one year. They do not assess how many jobs were lost in 
the longer-term. It is also too early to say how many jobs were lost following the 
huge increase in the minimum wage in agriculture in 2013 (shown in Figure 4), 
but anecdotal evidence suggests that job destruction was again considerable 
even over the short-term, affecting especially women.15 In the (tradable) forestry 
sector, Bhorat et al. (2013) found that the sectoral determination did not lead to 
any observed improvement in total earnings, because higher wages were offset 
by a reduction in working hours.   
 
                                                
15 e.g. Cape Times, 3rd December 2014. 
   
 
 22 
This econometric analysis accords with the predictions of the fifty-odd 
investigations of low-wage sectors conducted by the ECC over the past fifteen 
years. Every time the Minister instructed the ECC to investigate a sector and 
recommend new minima (and conditions of employment), the Department of 
Labour and ECC would investigate. In general, the Department of Labour and 
ECC sought to raise wages, but only as high as they considered possible without 
significant job destruction. After setting sectoral minima for the first time, the 
ECC increased minima on average by about 3.5 percent p.a. in real terms (most 
increases were less than this, but the average was pulled up by a few larger 
increases). Over time, the increases were substantial. In several sectors – 
farming, forestry, and wholesale and retail trade – minima were approximately 
doubled (in real terms) over ten to fifteen years (and this does not count the 
increase effected by the first sectoral determination in each of these sectors). In 
almost all cases, the Department of Labour and ECC assessed that these 
increases were all that could be achieved without a serious risk of job 
destruction. In very few of these cases did trade union representatives on the 
ECC dissent from the recommendation. In other words, trade union 
representatives on the ECC concurred with independent commissioners and 
business representatives on the ECC, and with Department of Labour personnel 
(many with backgrounds allied to the trade unions) that minima should be 
increased modestly to prevent job destruction. In several sectors – notably 
domestic work, the taxi industry and private security – the Department of 
Labour and ECC chose not to raise minima dramatically because they assessed 
the risk of job destruction to be too high. Most of the sectors regulated through 
sectoral determinations were non-tradable, and the econometric analyses suggest 
that the ECC generally struck a good balance between raising real wages, 
especially for the lowest-paid, and job conservation. 
 
The clear exception to this story, as the econometric analyses also suggest, is the 
agricultural sector. Case-studies in different parts of the country (Conradie, 
2007; Murray & van Walbeek 2007), as well Bhorat et al.’s analysis of national 
data (Bhorat et al., 2014), suggest that the original (2002) sectoral determination 
in agriculture raised minimum wages and improved compliance with non-wage 
regulations – but it also resulted in a significant reduction in total employment 
and/or hours worked. In late 2011, the ECC proposed that the minimum wage in 
agriculture be set at just over R1500 per month from March 2012. Later in 2012 
farmworkers in parts of the Western Cape engaged in dramatic protest, and the 
ANC and government rushed to announce that wages would be increased. 
Striking farmworkers demanded a minimum daily wage of at least R150 (or 
R3,600 per month, assuming a six-day week). Commissioned research suggested 
that higher wages would lead to job destruction, but job destruction would be 
modest if average daily wages were not raised above R104. The Minister of 
Labour then exerted considerable pressure on the Department of Labour and 
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ECC to endorse a new minimum of R105/day (or almost R2,300 per month), 
which would raise the average wage signicantly above R104/day. The ECC’s 
report warned that increasing average wages above R104/day would lead to job 
destruction and might have negative effects of farmworkers’ incomes because 
higher wages would be offset by job losses. A majority of the ECC’s members 
nonetheless endorsed the R105/day minimum. Anxious about the possibility of 
job destruction, however, the Department of Labour took the unprecedented step 
of allowing farmers to apply for exemption from these minimum wages on the 
grounds of unaffordability. It is not clear how many exemptions were submitted 
or approved. Having increased farmworkers’ minimum wage, the ECC had to 
decide whether the minimum wages for other low-wage workers – especially 
domestic workers – should also be increased. The Department of Labour warned 
that an increase in line with farmworkers would ‘either lead to massive layoffs 
or reduction in working hours’. The ECC concluded that very large increases 
would lead to job destruction, especially among lower-income employers, and 
recommended a slower rate of real increase (see Seekings, forthcoming b). 
 
Many of the sectors covered by bargaining councils are tradable, so that large 
increases in minimum wages risk job destruction. Trade unions in these sectors 
have generally desisted from demanding minima anywhere near those proposed 
by Coleman and COSATU. In the clothing industry, for example, SACTWU has 
pushed for steady increases in the minimum wages payable in lower-wage parts 
of the country (such as Newcastle in northern KwaZulu-Natal and Phutaditjaba 
in the southern Free State, see Figure 4). But SACTWU has been cautious in 
pushing for higher minima in its areas of core support, such as Cape Town 
(whilst pushing successfully for massive government subsidies to assist 
compliant factories to improve productivity and thus their international 
competitiveness). As SACTWU’s membership has grown in places like 
Newcastle, however, the union has lost its enthusiasm for closing non-compliant 
factories (Nattrass & Seekings, 2015). 
 
In sum, almost every time a labour-intensive sector is studied, whether by 
independent scholars or trade unionists, the result is a recommendation of 
modest real increases in minimum wages, because most independent scholars 
and trade unionists alike concur that substantial real increases are likely to lead 
to job destruction. Econometric analyses suggest that limited increases in non-
tradable sectors have generally had modest effects on employment, i.e. that the 
ECC generally struck a good balance between wages and employment (although 
methodologicial weaknesses in the econometric studies might result in an 
underestimation of job destruction). Tradable sectors have been more 
susceptible to job destruction, as trade unions and their representatives 
themselves recognise. There is thus plenty of evidence that the labour demand 
curve in South Africa slopes downwards, meaning that higher wages typically 
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translate into fewer hours worked and even job losses as firms shed their 
unskilled labour, mechanise, or move into less labour-intensive sectors (see also 
Pauw & Leibbrandt, 2012).  
 
Given that  South Africa’s unemployment rate was between 25,6 percent (if only 
active job seekers are counted as in the labour force) and 33.9 percent (if the so 
called ‘discouraged job seekers’ are included) in the first quarter of 2015,16 it is 
appropriate for the ECC, trade unions and government to be very concerned 
about the risk of job destruction. If existing minimum wages were doubled or 
tripled, as Coleman and COSATU suggest, it is almost certain that there would 
be dramatic job destruction. Entire tradable sectors (such as clothing) would be 
wiped out entirely. As importantly, any hope for labour-intensive economic 
growth would be eliminated. There is nothing in the South African or 
international experience to support Coleman’s contention that massive increases 
in the minimum wage would have no effect on employment.  
 
Coleman (and COSATU) have one final defence of very high minima. In their 
view, massive increases in minimum wages would generate the kind of wage-led 
growth that fuelled economic growth in Brazil until recently. It has also been 
suggested that the German model, of wage-driven productivity increases, offers 
lessons for South Africa. Unfortunately, these arguments misunderstand the 




Minimum wages, economic growth and the 
economic growth path  
 
Proponents of minimum wage growth often cite macroeconomic benefits in 
defence of their arguments. For example, Coleman (2013a, 2014a) and Isaacs 
and Fine (2015) argue that a minimum wage of between R4 800–R6 000 would 
be good for economic growth because it would boost aggregate demand 
(spending in the economy) thus encouraging firms to increase output and 
employment.17 In commenting on the proposed National Minimum Wage, Vavi 
                                                
16 Quarterly Labour Force Survey, First Quarter 2015, Statistics South Africa Statistical 
Release P0211, 26 May 2015. Available: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2015.pdf 
17 Neither Coleman nor Fine and Issacs confront the obvious question that if there is no trade-
off between wages and employment why not propose wage increases significantly higher than 
even this? The fact that they do not suggests that at some level, they accept that economic 
consequences are not always so rosy. It is unfortunate that they do not articulate this explicitly 
as their macroeconomic arguments give the impression that they believe there is never a trade 
off between wages and employment.   
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(then general secretary of COSATU) adopted a similar stance, telling reporters 
that “we must pay higher wages that will stimulate the demand for locally 
produced goods. That’s why the manufacturing sector lost all those jobs, 
because workers can’t afford [the goods] because of the low pay” (quoted in 
Zwane, 2014).   
 
  
Source: ILOSTAT (http://www.ilo.org/ilostat and World Development Indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators), various 
South African government gazettes. 
 




Vavi and Coleman cite the Brazilian case in support of their argument that 
wage-led growth is possible in South Africa. But the lessons from Brazil suggest 
that greater caution is needed. Firstly, as argued above, South African minimum 
wages are not out of line with what one would expect in middle-income 
countries, including Brazil. Figure 4 shows, using average sectoral and regional 
wages collated by the ILO, that by this measure South African minimum wages 
have been consistently above that for the Brazilian national minimum wage in 
purchasing power terms. Figure 4 also reports the low-wage sectors of (rural) 
domestic work and agriculture. It shows that these minima did rise steadily, 
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although lagging behind Brazil’s minimum – until 2013, when the lowest 
minimum for farm workers was increased sharply to a level above the Brazilian 
national minimum. The minima for South African domestic workers shown in 
Figure 4 are the lowest minima, with higher minima set for domestic workers in 
better-off parts of the country.  
 
Secondly, South Africa’s macroeconomic context and the recent Brazilian 
experience point to the constraints on wage-led growth. Theoretically, wage-led 
growth is possible if employers are compensated sufficiently for the higher 
wages they pay workers by the increased demand for their products that result 
from higher wages. The idea here is that higher domestic sales will generate 
sufficient profits and funds for investment that employment and output rise 
(Marglin and Bhaduri, 1990). Subsequent theoretical and empirical research 
showed that this happy scenario was less likely in an open economy (Bowles 
and Boyer, 1995). Two studies of the South African economy using 
macroeconomic simulations and data from the 1990s and 2000s respectively 
concluded that wage-led growth was not feasible, and that increasing the wage 
share would undermine investment, growth and employment (Gibson and Van 
Seventer, 2000; Oranan and Galanis, 2013). During the mid-2000s, Brazil did 
experience demand-led growth, fuelled by rising minimum wages, rising social 
security payments (including old age pensions, Bolsa Familia and other 
programmes, fuelling demand without increasing labour costs) and domestic 
savings that sufficed to finance investment. This helped cushion the impact of 
the 2008 global financial crisis, especially on the poor (ILO, 2011; Serrano and 
Suma, 2011). But this wage- and social-security-led growth dramatically ran up 
against the constraints of weakening global demand, falling commodity prices, 
an excess of consumption over investment, and domestic inflation. By 2013 
Brazil was running a large current account deficit (see Table 2), indicating that 
demand was fuelling imports, and the growing fiscal deficit meant little if any 
space for further increases in social assistance or the national minimum wage. 
Investment remained sluggish. The Brazilian economy stagnated in the early 
2010s before sliding into recession in 2014-15. Given that South Africa’s 
current account deficit was already at Brazilian levels, as was the share of 
household consumption and government consumption in GDP (see Table 2), the 
prospects for wage-led growth in South Africa seem poor.   
 
In short, the available macroeconomic evidence indicates that South Africa is 
supply rather than demand-constrained and that wage-led growth is likely to 
undermine investment and hence employment. Rather than rely on the fantasy of 
wage-led growth, it is more prudent to continue to set minimum wages sector by 
sector, taking into account economic conditions and hence likely job losses. 
Rather than model policy on Brazil in the mid-2000s, policy makers should look 
to the example of Mauritius in the 1970s where, acting on the recommendations 
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of the (progressive) economist James Meade, the country prioritized low-wage 
job creation, notably in the clothing industry, to address the unemployment 
problem. It was only once the labour market had tightened, that statutory 
minimum wages were raised because policy-makers wanted to ensure that there 
would be no job destruction (see Dabee & Greenaway, 2001).  
 
As shown in Table 2, South Africa has a much lower percentage of working-
aged people in employment than in Brazil and Germany and an unemployment 
rate about five times higher. South Africa’s colossal failure to create jobs is the 
key reason why South Africa’s Gini coefficient (measure of inequality) is worse 
than Brazil’s and why it has twice the share of population below the poverty 
line. South Africa’s labour-market and economic policies ought to prioritise job 
creation, and any proposals that risk further job losses, especially in labour-
intensive industry, should be treated with extreme caution. As Fields (2003) 
reminds us, the International Labour Organisation’s decent work agenda entails 
the dual objective of attaining full employment and better quality jobs and 
countries need to place themselves strategically on the continuum between these 
objectives. High unemployment economies like South Africa (and as was the 
case in Mauritius in the 1970s) should prioritise employment growth.    
 
 
Table 2. Brazil, Germany and South Africa: Key Indicators 
 
 Brazil Germany South Africa 
Government consumption as % GDP 
(2013) 21.9% 19.3% 22.2% 
Household consumption as % GDP 
(2013) 62.6% 55.9% 61.2% 
Current account deficit as % GDP 
(2013) -2.4% 6.9% -2.8% 
Government budget deficit as % of GDP 
(2014) -6.7% 0.1% -3.8% 
Labour force participation rate (2013) 70% 60% 52% 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, 
total (%) (modelled ILO estimate) 
(2013) 
66% 57% 39% 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour 





GINI index (World Bank estimate)  0.527 0.36 0.65 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day 
(PPP) (% of population) 2011 4.5% N/A 9.4% 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-30/brazil-s-budget-deficit-in-
december-twice-as-wide-as-forecast, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-
africa/government-budget. * Using PPP conversion factor for private 
consumption (international $) 2013.  
 
Even in Germany, where unemployment is low, the national minimum wage 
was introduced only after widespread consultation and concern about potential 
job losses. Germany has a long tradition of co-determination. Trade unions and 
employers concurred that the national minimum wage should be set at a level 
consistent with maintaining German economic competitiveness. Wages in 
Eastern Germany are typically lower than in West Germany, but even in Eastern 
Germany the national minimum wage of €8.5/hour was generally not seen as a 
threat to employment. For example, the largest low-wage employer in the 
formerly East German city of Erfurt – Amazon’s online supply depot – was 
already paying €9.50/hour, set by collective bargaining with the workers on the 
understanding that anything above that would result in the firm relocating to 
Poland.18 German jobs most at risk from a national minimum wage were 
restaurant waiters/waitresses, taxi drivers, and part-time ‘mini’ jobs, i.e. jobs 
(mostly aimed at married women wanting to work part-time) paying up to 
€450/month, the cut-off salary above which social security contributions needed 
to be made by employers.  
 
Table 2 shows that the share of consumer spending in the GDP was lower in 
Germany than in South Africa and Brazil, and that the country was running a 
significant current account surplus. This indicates that there was some 
macroeconomic room for wages to boost domestic demand following the 
introduction of a national minimum wage. As of May 2015, indications were 
that the new national minimum wage had caused some job losses (notably with 
regard to mini-jobs), but that these job losses were more than offset by the 
effects of continuing economic growth (Tiefensee, 2015).19 German export 
competitiveness was not affected but there was anecdotal evidence that taxi 
fares and restaurant prices had increased in some cities because of the new 
national minimum wage. The Confederation of German Employers’ 
Associations (BDA), which had initially opposed the introduction of a national 
minimum wage, argued that the biggest challenge for employers was not the 
                                                
18 Interview with Michael Panse, CDU Chairperson, Erfurt City Council, 1/6/15. 
19 This was the view of the national Department of Labour (interviews with Thorben Albrecht 
and Thomas Keysers 4/6/15), trade unions (interviews with Alexander Kirchner, the chair of 
EVG (4/6/15), and Eva Welskop-Deffaa from Verdi 3/6/15) employers (interviews with 
Stephan Fauth, the CEO of the Verband der Wirtschaft Thuringens e.V (2/6/15) and Peter 
Clever, BDA 4/6/15). It was also the view of elected officials in Eastern Germany (Michael 
Panse (CDU Chairperson, Erfurt City Council 1/6/15) 
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hourly wage rate per se but rather the bureaucratic costs of compliance (because 
employers are required to keep detailed records of wages and working hours).20   
 
Unlike in South Africa, where employers are treated with suspicion if not 
hostility by labour and government, great care was taken in Germany to assist 
employers with the introduction of the national minimum wage. A hotline was 
created for workers and employers to obtain advice and assistance and various 
vulnerable occupations were provided additional flexibility and time to comply. 
Wages of below €8.50/hour could continue for up to two years if these were the 
result of a collective agreement, and some sectors such as newspaper delivery, 
meat packing and agriculture were also given an additional two years to comply 
(German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2015: par 1.7 – 1.9).21 
The national minimum wage did not apply to those in apprenticeships or 
enrolled in measures to promote their participation in the labour market (ibid: 
par 2.1).   
 
In short, the national minimum wage was set in Germany at a level specifically 
designed not to threaten its national competitiveness, in a way that was flexible 
to the needs of different sectors, and in the context of a welfare system that 
provides income and job-related support for those in vulnerable occupations 
who may lose their jobs. Indications are that it was a successful policy in that 
employment continued to grow, social security contributions increased and 
many low-wage German workers benefited from rising incomes without losing 
their work. The impact on employment and profitability in foreign owned firms 
(which had previously been paying below minimum wages and which were a 
key target of the German national minimum wage) is, however, unknown. In 
any event, the ‘lesson’ for South Africa is that any proposed national minimum 
wage should be set only after widespread consultation with all interest parties 
including small as well as large employers from across the whole country, that it 
should not undermine competitiveness, and it should be introduced gradually 





South Africa already has the legislative framework for a national minimum 
wage (through the BCEA, as amended, in conjunction with the LRA). Most low-
wage workers are already covered under either the LRA or BCEA, and few of 
these are covered by sectoral minima that are below (in terms of purchasing 
                                                
20 This was argued to be the case by Thorben Albrecht of the Ministry of Labour and by Peter 
Clever (BDA) (both interviewed on 4/6/15).  
21 Interview with Albrecht. 
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power) the national minimum wage in Brazil. Sectoral minima have generally 
been set at these low levels for good reasons: In the affected sectors, higher 
minima are likely to lead to job destruction. In sectors where there is less risk of 
job destruction, minima have been higher (making many of them significantly 
higher than the national minimum in Brazil, in relation to either the cost of 
living or GDP per capita). Trade unions and their representatives have generally 
concurred with this modest wage-setting. South Africa’s existing system for 
minimum wage-setting ensures that minima entail much the same standard of 
living and share of GDP as does Brazil’s system, whilst usually taking into 
account risks of job destruction. 
 
Why, then, are Coleman and COSATU insistent on setting a much higher 
national minimum wage? First, they emphasise that poverty remains stubbornly 
and unacceptably high in South Africa, even among households that include 
workers. Increasing wages would reduce poverty, as long as jobs were not 
destroyed. Secondly, according to Coleman and COSATU, any minor job 
destruction caused directly by a higher national minimum wage would be more 
than offset by the job-creating effects of wage-led growth. The result, they 
would have us believe, would be reduced poverty and inequality.  
 
Unfortunately, neither international nor South African evidence support this 
assessment. In Brazil, poverty has fallen as much because of very low 
unemployment rates and expanding social protection as of rising minimum 
wages. Many households have risen above the poverty line because they have 
more than one wage coming in. Moreover, the balance of international evidence 
is that high minimum wages generally do destroy less skilled jobs. Such effects 
are only offset by the job-creating effects of wage-led growth when imports do 
not rise, domestic investment and production expands, and employers expand 
production in relatively labour-intensive ways. None of these conditions pertain 
in South Africa (or in Brazil, as is evident from Brazil’s current economic 
crisis). If high minimum wages result in the destruction of unskilled jobs then 
the benefits of higher wages will be offset by lower employment, and the 
outcome is likely to be increased inequality and poverty. 
 
COSATU might not be concerned primarily with poverty. Indeed, COSATU’s 
core membership has prospered under democracy, enjoying rising real wages. 
Trade union members are concentrated in the more skilled, better paid end of the 
workforce, disproportionately in the public sector (Seekings, 2014). This means 
not only that for a national minimum wage to have any ‘bite’ at all among trade 
union members it would have to be set at a high level, but also very few trade 
unions have many members in the kinds of lower-waged jobs at risk of 
destruction. The one union which would obviously be at risk of being wiped out 
entirely – SACTWU, in the clothing sector – has been conspicuously coy in the 
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current national minimum wage debate, perhaps because it believes that higher 
labour costs would be offset by massive state subsidies (see Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2015). COSATU might be more concerned with the ‘wage gap’ – by 
which it means the gap between the salaries of top executives and the wages of 
trade union members – than with poverty. A high national minimum wage 
would reduce the wage gap (although not as effectively as through taxation of 
top earners). 
 
It is possible that COSATU’s concerns are as much political as economic. The 
Marikana Massacre (in August 2012) came to symbolise discontent not only 
over wages but also with COSATU. The deepening crisis within COSATU – 
culminating in the expulsion of the Metalworkers’ Union NUMSA and the 
suspension and later expulsion of COSATU general-secretary Zwelinzima Vavi 
– meant more pressure on unions to ‘deliver’. At the same time, the political 
power enjoyed through the ANC and ANC-led Alliance seems rather more 
useful and usable than the organisational power rooted in shopfloor structures 
(Buhlungu, 2010). The experience of the 2012 Western Cape farmworkers’ 
strike and 2013 minimum wage increase would have made evident to union 
leaders the possibility of using political power (through the ANC and 
government) effectively to subvert the usual, sectoral wage-setting procedures 
provided under the BCEA. 
 
The issue at stake is not whether wages should be regulated countrywide, with a 
view to preventing the exploitation of vulnerable workers, but whether the 
existing system should be discarded and replaced with a new system that 
empowers trade union leaders to use political power to set a minimum without 
substantive consideration of the effects on employment and poverty. Ours is not 
an argument against wage regulation. Our position is in the middle of the 
minimum wage debate, in between the principled hostility to wage regulation of 
the Free Market Foundation and the National Employers Association of South 
Africa (Urbach, 2015)22, and the position of Coleman, COSATU and allied 
intellectuals (such as Isaacs and Fine) that a national minimum wage should be 
set at a high level through an essentially political process without regard for th 
effects on employment and poverty. In our assessment, South Africa’s existing 
institutions for wage-setting have been broadly successful, raising real minima 
with many sectors without destroying many jobs. But our position is not a 
defence of all of the minima set by bargaining councils and the Minister of 
Labour (under the LRA) or the ECC (under the BCEA). In tradable sectors like 
clothing manufacturing (regulated under the LRA) and agriculture (regulated 
under the BCEA), the evidence suggests that rapid increases in minima have 
                                                
22 See also http://www.neasa.co.za/Press-Room/Video-links-and-podcasts/The-introduction-
of-a-national-minimum-wage.aspx 
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already contributed to large-scale job destruction. The ECC might even have 
been too conservative in assessing the potential for increased minima in some, 
mostly non-tradable sectors, although it is unlikely that any such caution has had 
more than a marginal effect. A national minimum, set at an appropriate level 
through appropriate procedures with attention paid to employment effects in 
vulnerable sectors, would probably enhance equity and social justice. The 
obvious way forward is simply for the Minister of Labour to instruct the existing 
ECC to propose a minimum wage applicable to all sectors not currently covered 
by sectoral determinations or bargaining councils, using the provisions of the 
amended BCEA, and taking employment effects into account (as required under 
the BCEA). There is no need for new legislation or any new institution.  
 
Wage-setting institutions do require some reforms if they are to protect 
vulnerable workers without destroying their jobs. First, the LRA needs to be 
reformed to ensure that the interests of small businesses are taken into account 
more effectively in bargaining councils. Secondly, the extension mechanism 
provided under the LRA needs to be reviewed, requiring the Minister of Labour 
to take job destruction into account when extending collective agreements 
reached in bargaining councils. Thirdly, the Department of Labour and 
especially ECC require substantial additional resourcing in order to allow more 
substantial research on the likely benefits and risks of new wage minima. The 
contrast between the minimal research capacity of the ECC and the considerable 
capacity of (say) the Low Wage Commission in the UK is very striking. It is 
possible that improved information would justify higher minima than at present 
in some sectors (such as domestic work). 
 
Minimum wages present one of the most difficult choices to any policymaker 
concerned with poverty, inequality and unemployment. It demands careful 
analysis and nuanced policy interventions – not a blanket approach to a very 
complex matter with high risks of unintended and perverse consequences. It also 
needs to be sensitively negotiated with employers (representative across all 
sectors and of small and large firms) before being introduced. This was the key 
message of Thorben Albrecht, the Permanent State Secretary at the Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Germany) to two South African 
delegations invited to Germany to study the impact of a national minimum wage 
in South Africa.23 South Africa would do well to heed this advice. The main 
lesson from the German case is not demand-led growth (as implied by 
COSATU) but concern across all social partners with competitiveness and co-
determination.  
 
                                                
23 Interview with Thorben Albrecht, 4/6/15.  
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Recognising that a high national minimum wage is not a panacea for poverty in 
the South African context does not mean that nothing more can be done about 
poverty or inequality. On the contrary, redistributing from rich to poor through 
tax-financed social assistance and job creation programmes (whether through 
wage subsidies or public employment programmes) serves to reduce the 
disposable income of the rich and increase the disposable income of the poor 
without increasing labour costs. Poverty and inequality are thus reduced without 
undermining international competitiveness or incentivizing employers to 
substitute capital (and more skilled labour) for less skilled labour. Policy 
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